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I ARTICLE I




Three years ago Professors MacRae, Woodruff, and I pub-
lished an article in this law review entitled Gays in the Military:
What About Morality, Ethics, Character and Honor?' In that
article we developed moral arguments that justify the "don't ask,
don't tell" policy of the armed forces. We recommended that the
Justice and Defense Departments use those arguments when
defending the policy in court and in the press!
The "don't ask, don't tell" policy was enacted by Congress in
late 1993 and implemented by Defense Department and service
regulations that took effect in February 1994.' Under "don't ask,
* Professor Emeritus, Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,
Lt. Col. U.S. Army ret.
1. See Arthur A. Murphy, Leslie M. MacRae, William A. Woodruff, Gays in the
Military: What About Morality, Ethics, Character and Honor? 99 DICK. L. REV. 331 (1995)
[hereinafter What About Morality?].
2. See id. at 354.
3. The statutory policy was codified in 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994) and implemented by a
series of directives, instructions, and memoranda issued by the Department of Defense, and
regulations issued by the individual services that generally became effective on February 28,
1994. See, e.g., Department of Defense Directives 1304.26 (Qualification Standards for
Enlistment); 1332.14 (Enlisted Administrative Separations); 1332.30 (Separation of Regular
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don't tell," gays, lesbians, and bisexuals can enlist or accept a
commission without being questioned about their sexual proclivi-
ties. They can remain in the armed forces as long as they do not
disclose their homosexuality by engaging in homoerotic conduct,
making a statement that admits homosexual behavior or propensity,
or marrying a person of the same sex. If they violate the policy
and are caught they are subject to administrative discharge
proceedings.4
There have been significant developments concerning this
policy since I wrote the What About Morality? article with
Professors Woodruff and MacRae three years ago. The policy has
been challenged on constitutional grounds, and some of the cases
have reached and been decided by the federal appellate courts.'
There has been a great deal of commentary, much of it disputing
the wisdom and constitutionality of "don't ask, don't tell," in the
media6 and in law reviews.7 Gay activists and their supporters are
constantly attacking the fairness of the policy and the way it is
administered.' They charge that commanders frequently interro-
gate individuals about their sexuality and start investigations
Commissioned Officers). Regarding the statute and implementing regulations and
troublesome discrepancies between the two, see William A. Woodruff, Homosexuality and
Military Services: Legislation, Implementation and Litigation, 64 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV.
121, 150-55, 168-73 (1995).
4. For a more complete summary of the statutory policy, see Murphy et al.,, supra note
1, at 332-33. See also infra Appendix A.
5. See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the policy);
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (upholding the policy), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 258 (1996); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(declaring the policy invalid as violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
equal protection).
6. See, e.g., Jennifer Egan, Uniforms in the Closet, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 28,
1998, at 26-31, 40, 48, 56 ("'Don't ask, don't tell' has created a world of fear and deceit for
gay servicemen, alienating them from both fellow servicemen and the civilian gay world.");
Frank Rich, The 2 Tim McVeighs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1998, at A27 (characterizing the
"Don't ask, don't tell" policy as absurd, bigoted, and shortening exemplary careers);
Editorial, The Trouble With "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1998, at A24
(arguing that the policy is being badly administered and is inherently unjust, Clinton erred
in letting himself be bullied into approving it).
7. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality and the Law: Devlin
Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237 (1996); Walter John Krygowski, Comment, Homosexuality
and the Military Mission: The Failure of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy, 20 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 875 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Undone by 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell,", N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
9, 1998, at A27; Gregory L. Vistica & Evan Thomas, Backlash in the Ranks, TIME, Apr. 20,
1998, at 27; Tim Wiener, Military Discharges of Homosexuals Soar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998,
at 27.
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without the credible evidence of a violation that the regulations
demand.9 They claim that harassment of gays and lesbians by
fellow servicemen has increased." The Defense Department has
answers for some but not all the complaints." Perhaps the most
significant event has been the 1996 decision of Romer v. Evans,12
the Supreme Court's major pronouncement on homosexual rights
since the 1986 benchmark case, Bowers v. Hardwick.' 
3
This essay will bring the research up to date on the morality
arguments that were proposed in our 1995 What About Morality?
article. Initially, those arguments will be presented without
referring to Romer v. Evans. The question of whether Romer
requires any change in tactics will then be explored. Can the
morality arguments still be used, with or without modification, to
defend "don't ask, don't tell"? Can that policy be amended in
some way that will make it easier to defend? Finally, even if
Romer does not require that "don't ask, don't tell" be amended,
should Congress, the President, and the armed forces consider
adopting a less stringent, compromise homosexual personal policy?
II. The Neglected Moral Bases for the Policy
The greatest weakness in the government's defense of "don't
ask, don't tell" has been its failure to assert in a strong, affirmative
fashion the ultimate justification for treating homosexuals different-
ly than heterosexuals. Homosexual behavior is offensive to the
institutional morality of the armed forces and to the individual
moral values of most service members. Moral and ethical principle
are at the heart of the military's reluctance to associate itself with
self-acknowledged, sexually active gays and lesbians."
The opponents of "don't ask, don't tell" have been exploiting
the administration's failure to develop and stress the moral
justification. The opponents contend that the policy is unconsti-
tutional because it caters to the prejudice, bias, bigotry, homopho-
bia, and animosity of the straight members and leaders of the
armed forces. They have convinced a number of federal judges and
much of the liberal media that they are right. Four judges who
9. See Andrew Sullivan, supra note 8, at A27.
10. See id.
11. See id.; Vistica & Thomas, supra note 8, at 27.
12. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
13. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14. See Murphy et al., supra note 1, at 334-35, 354-55.
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dissented from the Fourth Circuit's 1996 decision in Thomasson v.
Perry5 to uphold the policy were persuaded that the policy
reflects irrational prejudice.1 6 In July 1997, United States District
Judge Eugene Nickerson in Able v. United Statest 7 ruled that
"don't ask, don't tell" violates the equal protection and free speech
provisions of the United States Constitution.18 Judge Nickerson
spoke dismissively of moral considerations:
Other than the arguments as to privacy and sexual tension
the only explanation the government offers for the
perceived "disruptive effect that the presence of members who
engage in homosexual acts would have on the other members
of the unit" is that their presence would raise "concerns" of
heterosexual members "based on moral precepts and ethical
values. ....
This is an outright confession that "unit cohesion" is a
euphemism for catering to the prejudices of heterosexuals.19
The New York Times has lionized Judge Nickerson, praising all his
rulings in the Able case.2°
The failure of the government to occupy and defend the moral
high ground is the result of a decision presumably made during the
1993 negotiations and legislative process that led to "don't ask,
don't tell." That decision was to justify the policy by strictly
utilitarian reasoning. There would be no explicit reference in the
statute and in Pentagon regulations to moral and ethical consider-
ations." The policy would be devoid of rhetoric like that used by
the generals and admirals of The Military Working Group who
were directed in 1993 to study and make recommendations about
the military's homosexual policy.2 The Group reported, "the
shared moral values of the institution-the collective sense of right
and wrong-provide the foundation .... It also provides to
15. 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996).
16. See id. at 949 (Hall, C.J. dissenting).
17. 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd 199 U.S. App. LEXIS (2d Cir. Sept. 23,
1998).
18. See id. at 865.
19. Id. at 858.
20. See, e.g., Editorial, Banning Gay Soldiers by Trickery, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 1995, at
18.
21. See Murphy et al., supra note 1, at 334.
22. See id. at 342 n.34.
[Vol. 102:3
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individual service members the moral basis for personal service,
commitment and sacrifice.
23
I won't try to pin down the thinking and motives of the people
who participated in the decision to eschew moral arguments. One
can assume that politics and President Clinton's sympathy for the
cause of homosexual rights were major factors. 4 General Colin
Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, offered another explanation
when testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee. The
General testified that he and other military leaders should not
"use ... [their] official position to make moral or religious
judgments on this issue."25 Apparently General Powell, Senator
Sam Nunn, and other decision makers did not foresee the extent to
which future challengers of the policy could capitalize on their
failure to spell out the moral bases for the policy. They probably
counted too much on the federal courts continuing to defer to the
judgment of Congress and the Commander-in-Chief on this
essentially military matter.
The statute enacting "don't ask, don't tell" includes separate
findings that describe the unique nature and needs of America's
armed forces.26 The last finding states a conclusion drawn from
the previous fourteen and illustrates the utilitarian/pragmatic tenor
of all fifteen:
The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate
a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would
create an unacceptable risk to the armed forces high standards
of morale, good order and discipline and unit cohesion that are
the essence of military capability. 7
When defending "don't ask, don't tell" in court, the administration
has been elaborating on this and the other findings recited in the
statute and implementing regulations. One of the other findings is
that living and working conditions in the service sometimes entail
"forced intimacy with little or no privacy."'  Justice Department
23. See id.
24. See id. at 335; see also DAVID MIXNER, STRANGER AMONG FRIENDS 2-5, 210, 271-
310 (1996) (Account by long-time homosexual friend of President Clinton of homosexual
support for the first Clinton campaign and of disappointment when he failed to deliver on
his promise to secure equal treatment for gays in the military).
25. Murphy et al., supra note 1, at 334.
26. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)-(15) (1994).
27. Id. § 654(a)(15).
28. Id. § 654(a)(12).
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briefs dwell on the "sexual tension" that is likely to result if non-
homosexuals and known homosexuals share close quarters. Some
heterosexuals may be squeamish about being ogled and about the
possibility of overt advances.
29
III. Articulating the Moral Argument
The administration needs to make a greater effort to articulate
the policy's moral basis when defending "don't ask, don't tell."
Bowers v. Hardwick, ° the 1986 benchmark case, supplies the key
to a powerful morality-based defense. In Bowers, the Supreme
Court declared that the state of Georgia could apply its sodomy
statute to punish consensual intercourse between two homosexuals
in the privacy of the home.31 The majority, speaking through
Justice White, refused to read into the Constitution a fundamental
right to commit homosexual sodomy; that behavior had been
condemned in America for too long and was still condemned too
widely to be a constitutional right.32 Consequently, the Georgia
statute had only to meet a rational basis test to satisfy Fourteenth
Amendment due process.3 3 Justice White found a rational basis
in "the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia
that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable., 34  Al-
though Bowers addresses a due process claim, its holding is readily
extended to meet the equal protection attacks being made on
"don't ask, don't tell." Bowers implies that homosexuals are not a
suspect class and that as long as there is a rational basis for doing
so they can be treated differently than heterosexuals.35
Bowers accepts the traditional morality of the majority as
adequate justification for making homosexual sodomy a crime. An
administrative separation from the service under "don't ask, don't
29. Testimony that I encountered during an administrative discharge hearing while the
deputy staff judge advocate of a U.S. Army division in 1956 is illustrative. In that
proceeding, a soldier testified: "I woke up. There was a hand on my penis. It was not my
own. It was the respondent's." Because storytelling is now fashionable in academic writing,
I'll illustrate this piece with an occasional timeless anecdote.
30. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
31. See id. at 189.
32. See id. at 192-94.
33. See id. at 189-90.
34. Id. at 196.
35. See, e.g., Mark A. Papadopoulos, Inkblot Jurisprudence: Romer v. Evans as a Great
Defeat for the Gay Rights Movement, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 165, 173-75 (1997);
Feldblum, supra note 7, at 282-85; Arthur A. Murphy, Homosexuality and the Law: Tolerance
and Containment II, 97 DICK. L. REV. 693, 699 n.24 (1993).
[Vol. 102:3
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tell" is not as drastic a sanction as criminal conviction and impris-
onment.36 Thus, traditional majority morality, by itself, may
suffice to justify discharges for homosexuality. If we add to this
morality all the related utilitarian factors identified in the statute
and regulations-unit cohesion, morale, and individual priva-
cy-there is certainly more than a rational basis for the policy.37
What does it mean to speak of the military's "majority
morality" with regard to homosexuality? The term can be
understood in at least two ways. First, it can relate to the individu-
al moral beliefs and sentiments of all the men and women of the
armed forces, from new recruits to the chairman of the joint chiefs.
Do most of them have a strong conviction that homosexual conduct
is wrong-that it is conduct in which they and their fellow service
members ought not to engage? Second, the term "majority
morality" can relate to the individual moral beliefs and sentiments
of a smaller, more select group-the experienced, active duty
members of the officers' and non-commissioned officers' corps.38
Are most of these people convinced that homosexual conduct is
wrong-conduct from which everyone in the military ought to
abstain? This second type of "majority morality" may fairly be
labeled "institutional morality."'3 9
To equate the collective understanding of right and wrong of
experienced active duty officers and NCOs to the institutional
morality of the military makes sense; it is probably as close as one
can get to representative democracy in a hierarchal organization
like the armed forces. These are the people who run the military
enterprise and who may spend five to thirty-five years of their lives
36. See Lynn A. Baker, The Missing Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v. Evans,
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 387, 389 (1997) ("[A]rguments that a 'greater' governmental power
includes a lesser one have been part of American jurisprudence at least since the time of
Justice Holmes."); cf. S.I. Strong, Justice Scalia as a Modern Lord Devlin: Animus and Civil
Burdens in Romer v. Evans, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1997) (disagreeing with the course
the law has been taking, but acknowledging the modem trend to blur the differences
between civil and criminal law and to use civil and administrative remedies to address
criminal problems).
37. See Murphy et al., supra note 1, at 344-48, 350. For an argument that morality helps
refute the claim that "don't ask, don't tell" violates the free speech of homosexuals, see id.
at 348-50.
38. Non-commissioned officers will hereinafter, be referred to as "NCO's."
"Experienced" officers include both recent and older graduates of the service academies.
39. See Murphy et al., supra note 1, at 336-38. One can argue that institutional morality
should be defined in a more abstract, less majoritarian fashion, that is, as traditional morality
or as a military version of natural law. See id. at 337-38.
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under its regime. These people have been promoted based on
assessments of their character and knowledge of the military. They
occupy leadership and other responsible positions from top to
bottom in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. For
better or for worse, they instruct those under and around them
about morality, ethics, character, and honor, even if only by
example. As a group they have a central role in preserving,
modifying, and transmitting "traditional" military ideals and moral
values.4°
When applying Bowers in the military context, "institutional
morality," the traditional majority morality of experienced officers
and NCOs, is probably more significant than the majority morality
of the entire military population. In any event, one is probably
correct in assuming that both majorities regard homosexual conduct
as immoral and a homosexual propensity as an undesirable
character trait or an unfortunate compulsion.
Note that my interpretation of the Bowers concept of "majori-
ty morality" is democratic in two senses. First, "majority" refers to
a large population. Second, "morality," or moral beliefs, is defined
inclusively to refer to each individual's convictions about what
constitutes right and wrong behavior. The religious or the
philosophical foundations of an individual's moral beliefs can be
metaphysical or pragmatic, obvious or obscure, sophisticated or
blue collar, widely shared or idiosyncratic. Of course, there is a
point beyond which a particular belief is so patently evil or silly
that it would not deserve the label "moral" in the constitutional law
semantics of the Bowers decision. A perverse tenet of a neo-nazi
or satanic cult is an example. However, the beliefs of particular
individuals that it is immoral, moral, or of no moral consequence
for two adults to engage in consensual, homoerotic activity are not
beyond the pale. All qualify as "moral" beliefs in an inclusive,
democratic sense.41
There are many sources from which individual officers, NCOs,
and other enlisted persons derive the moral principles and values
that they believe apply within the service. Of course, they enter
the service with character, moral outlook, and religious faith, if they
have one, more or less formed by their civilian lives. After entry,
they remain subject to the currents and cross-currents of American
40. See id.
41. See id. at 336-37.
[Vol. 102:3
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civilian society and culture. But after several years of being part
of the unique organization and society of the armed forces, and
being exposed to its traditional values, most officers and NCOs will
share those values.
42
Although increasing numbers of Americans approve or
complacently accept homosexual behavior, the majority still
disapprove or have serious reservations about that sort of con-
duct.43 The overwhelming grass roots and political opposition to
homosexual marriage that led Congress to pass the "Defense of
Marriage Act"' shows that most Americans still do not agree with
Andrew Sullivan's book that gays and lesbians are "virtually
normal., 45  The traditional Judeo-Christian condemnation of
sodomy continues to shape individual moral thinking and attitudes
either directly through a person's religious faith or indirectly as the
unacknowledged source of ethical belief or cultural taboo. Most
people believe that while men and women are a lot alike their basic
natures are different and complementary in important respects. A
corollary of this belief is likely to be a conviction that homosexual
conduct is socially and morally undesirable. One need not pin
down the genesis of such convictions in order to credit their
reality.'
Experienced officers and NCOs are likely to be more conser-
vative on social issues than the public at large. They live and work
in a subculture in which the professional military tradition of
"Duty, Honor, Country"47 contends with the American democratic
and libertarian traditions. The professional military tradition
regards obedience and subordination of personal interests as
paramount virtues for servicemen and women. Fusing of the
official and private spheres of its members' lives is a basic feature
of that tradition. Beliefs about what it means to be a man or
woman are especially deeply rooted in the military that depends for
42. See id. at 339.
43. See, e.g., Carey Goldberg, Acceptance of Gay Men and Lesbians Is Growing, Study
Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1998, at A21; Alan Wolf, The Homosexual Exception, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Feb. 8, 1998, at 46 (discussing a study that shows that suburban Americans are
surprisingly tolerant of everyone but gay men and lesbians); Murphy et al., supra note 1, at
343.
44. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
45. ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL (1995).
46. See Murphy et al. supra note 1, at 344 n.41.
47. This phrase has been the motto of West Point for one-hundred years.
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much of its strength on the martial and "manly" character of its
predominantly male personnel.48
Being conservative, most seasoned officers and NCOs are
resistant to social experiments and tampering with things that seem
to work well.49 They know the weak and irrational side of human
nature. They are aware that there is no unbreachable protective
mechanism that keeps immature, confused, lonely, frightened, or
licentious straight people from yielding to impulse or seduction. °
Most seasoned officers and NCOs fear, with good reason, that if
the military "endorses" homosexual behavior by imposing no more
constraints on homosexuals than on heterosexuals, the number of
gays and lesbians will increase to some unpredictable extent, while
the frequency of same gender sexual activity and the number of
self-styled "bisexuals" is likely to multiply. Most seasoned officers
and NCOs may feel that the increased numbers will not be limited
to previously repressed, unhappy homosexuals. They suspect that
a homosexual orientation is not, as the current scientific orthodoxy
suggests, always fixed solely by nature or very early nurture. They
think it possible that a permissive, sex-saturated moral environment
may play a part in shaping the homosexual or bisexual orientation
of an individual, or in other words that culture may directly or
indirectly condition children and impressionable young adults to
self-identify as homosexual or bisexual.51
48. See Murphy et al., supra note 1, at 344 n.43.
49. See id. at 344 n.42.
50. I recall one soldier testifying at a court-martial trial at which I was the military judge
that it was alcohol, curiosity, and the defendant's blandishments that induced him to bugger
the defendant.
51. The January-February 1998 issue of HARVARD MAGAZINE included an article about
the life of gay men at Harvard University. The next issue published a critical letter to the
editor from Nathaniel S. Lehrman, M.D. Doctor Lehrman, the retired clinical director of
a psychiatric center in Brooklyn, N.Y., made these points:
Sexual feelings toward forbidden individuals pervade our American
culture.... Ads showing near-naked men in provocative poses now similarly
stimulate increasingly accepted homosexual feelings any of us can have....
If we recognize the insignificance of sexual feelings, including the
homosexual, we can dismiss them easily.... People preoccupied with homosexual
feelings easily come to believe they are indeed "homosexual," especially if a
clergyman or therapist confirms that "orientation," It is particularly important for
teenage boys, and those who counsel them to recognize the fluidity of adolescent
sexual feelings ....
... Gay communities, of which Harvard has many are then more than
willing to confirm such "orientations" by enlisting these men in their homosexual
culture and activities.
[Vol. 102:3
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Conservative officers and NCOs, like many civilians, are
unhappy with the more feckless changes in our national mores that
began in the late 1960's. They see full-time and part-time homo-
sexuals, and their apologists, subverting what little remains of the
old moral consensus, the institutions of marriage and family, and
the kind of society they want for their children." Conservative
officers and NCOs may agree with General Colin Powell that they
should not preach morality to civilians, but they won't mind if the
military's homosexual personnel policy furnishes an example of
moral constancy to the larger society.
Experienced officers and NCO's are aware of practical
problems that may occur less frequently and be easier to deal with
as long as the number of homosexuals and the amount of same
gender sexual activity are kept in check. They are familiar with the
high rates of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases
among homosexual males. 3  They may know that promiscuity,
concealment of HIV-positive status from sex partners, and other
unsafe sex practices are resurgent in the homosexual men's
community.54 Some officers and NCOs have seen or heard about
situations like one I observed fifty years ago while serving in an
Army engineer battalion. There were rumors that the captain
commanding one company was "queer." The battalion commander
ignored the rumors until the captain was accused of fraternizing
with young enlisted men and favoring some of them with promo-
tions and good assignments. After an investigation proved the
accusation true and that the captain had also gotten drunk with at
HARVARD MAGAZINE, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 11-12. Cf MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY - VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION 3-13, 57-59, 70-73 (Vintage Books ed. 1990)
(1978 transl.) (arguing culture is a determinant of sexual thinking and practices). But see
Feldblum, supra note 7, at 323-27 (discussing harm that results when "real gays" repress their
natural desires or conceal their sexual identity because of legal and social distinctions
between homosexuals and non-homosexuals).
52. See Murphy, supra note 35, at 694-95; Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kultur-
kampf" Supreme Court Storytelling, the Culture Wars and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 345, 369-71. Duncan concludes that the sexual revolution has wreaked havoc on the
quality of life in our society and has infected our corporate health polluted the popular
culture, and damaged the lives of countless children and families. See id. Duncan further
concludes that individual liberty and religious freedom of moral traditionalists are becoming
casualties.
53. See Murphy, supra note 35, at 704 n.33.
54. See Sheryl G. Stolberg, Gay Culture Weighs Sense and Sexuality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 1997, at WK1; Alan J. Mayer, The Irresponsibility That Spreads AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 1997, at A17.
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least one young soldier and sodomized him, the captain was
discharged. Knowledgeable officers and NCOs sense that the
military has enough problems with sex-witness the Tailhook and
Aberdeen scandals55-without abandoning moral tradition and
endorsing homosexual behavior by opening the ranks to professing,
practicing gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.
The moral justification for "don't ask, don't tell" is especially
important when it comes to applying the policy to women. The
pragmatic arguments for excluding lesbians are not very strong.
Compared to gay men, lesbians are much less likely to be sexually
aggressive, promiscuous, and subject to HIV/AIDS and other
sexually transmitted diseases. Compared to ultra-feminine
women,56 lesbian women are typically more military in appear-
ance, conduct and attitude, and more physically fit. Women tend
to be more tolerant of homosexuality than men. The presence of
known lesbians is likely to be less disruptive than the presence of
ultra-feminine women or men known to be gay.
57
Finally, my proposal that the government should emphasize
morality when defending "don't ask, don't tell" calls only for the
55. In September 1991 the Tailhook Association, which included many Navy and Marine
aviators, held a convention in Las Vegas. There was a great deal of drunkenness and sexual
misconduct. See Murphy et al., supra note 1, at 340 n.30; Philip Shenon, 5 Years Later, Navy
Is Still Reeling From Tarnish of Tailhook Incident, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1996, at B6. During
1997 a spate of sex-related offenses by male drill instructors at the Army's Aberdeen,
Maryland training facility involving female recruits were investigated and prosecuted. See
Elaine Sciolino, Army Trial Raises Questions Of Sex, Power and Discipline, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
12, 1997, at 1,8. The Armed Forces must deal with a host of social problems besides sexual
misconduct. Some of these problems are fairly recent developments, others have always
existed. They include maintaining racial harmony, integrating women, coping with the
domestic and financial problems of personnel, and "de-glamorizing" heavy drinking. See,
e.g., Murphy et al., supra note 1, at 355; Charles C. Moskos, Jr., From Citizens' Army to
Social Laboratory, THE WILSON QUARTERLY, Winter 1993, at 83 (discussing problems of
race, gender and sexual orientation); Steven L. Majers, Defense Chief Rejects Advice to
Separate Sexes in Training, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 1998, at Al, A23; Report: Money Woes
Harm Navy Personnel, THE SENTINEL (Carlisle, PA), Feb. 6, 1998 at Al; Eric Schmitt,
Pentagon Fights Wider Sale of Beer and Wine, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1998, at 2. See generally
Arthur A. Murphy, The Soldier's Right to a Private Life, 24 MILITARY L. REv. 97 (1964)
(providing a historical perspective).
56. By "ultra-feminine women," I mean women whose appearance and behavior are
sensuous.
57. Professor Diane H. Mazur contends that the arguments on which the government
has been relying to show a rational basis do not constitutionally justify applying "don't ask,
don't tell" to women. She makes a strong case for this position in Remaking Distinctions on
the Basis of Sex: Must Gay Women Be Admitted to the Military Even If Gay Men Are Not,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 953 (1997). Of course, the government's arguments to date have
underplayed morality.
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voicing of something already implicit in the language of the statute
and regulations. However much General Powell, Senator Sam
Nunn, Congress, and the Executive Branch in 1993 may have
wanted to bypass moral issues, they could not avoid dealing with
them and taking a position by implication. The legislative findings
recited in section 654(a) of the statute imply that homosexual
conduct violates deeply held individual and institutional beliefs that
the conduct is morally wrong.5" These are findings that the
presence of individuals who demonstrate a propensity for homosex-
ual conduct would adversely affect good order and discipline,
morale, individual privacy, and unit cohesion. Some, if not all, of
the adverse effects have to be caused or exacerbated by widespread
disapproval within the armed forces of homosexual conduct. Much
of that disapproval must inevitably stem from moral sentiments; a
number of officers and military clergymen who have written to me
in the last three years confirm this conclusion.59
IV. Is Romer v. Evans a Threat to the Policy?
What effect does Romer v. Evans,6° have on Bowers61 and
everything I have discussed? In Romer the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of the celebrated/notorious
"Amendment 2" to the Colorado state constitution.62  Amend-
ment 2 was adopted in 1992 by statewide referendum following a
contentious campaign.63 The Colorado amendment prohibited
every branch of state and local government from adopting or
58. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)-(15) (1994).
59. See Murphy et al., supra note 1, at 341. An active duty major general wrote this
about the 1995 article:
Your analysis of the moral justification underlying the Government's policy on
homosexuality highlights an important dimension of this often contentious issue,
and adds a meaningful insight to the public debate. Translating the institutional
morality of the armed forces into a substantive legal position sufficient to
withstand constitutional scrutiny reflects a refreshingly straightforward and
intellectually honest perspective. The fact that you and one of your co-authors are
former career Army officers certainly enhances your credibility as spokesmen for
the corporate morality of the military.
Archbishop Joseph Dimino commended the 1995 article to the bishops and priests of the
Catholic archdiocese for the military services. Copies of correspondence alluded to in this
essay are on file in the office of the DICKINSON LAW REVIEW.
60. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
61. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
62. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
63. See id.
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enforcing any law or policy that granted a protected status or claim
of discrimination based on gay, lesbian, or bisexual orientation or
conduct. 4 One consequence was to void Denver, Boulder, and
Aspen city ordinances that forbade discrimination against homosex-
uals in employment, housing, and public accommodations. 65 The
Supreme Court held that "Amendment 2" violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.66
One remarkable aspect of the majority opinion is that it does
not mention Bowers. I'll quote enough of Justice Kennedy's words
to enable the reader to get a sense of whether Romer might affect
Bowers and the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy:
In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be said to
advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems
unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if
the rationale for it seems tenuous .... By requiring that the
classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and
legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications are not
drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by
the law ....
Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of judicial
review .... It identifies persons by a single trait and then
denies them protection across the board. The resulting
disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek
specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our
jurisprudence ....
A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for
one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the
government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in
the most literal sense ....
A second and related point is that laws of the kind now
before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected. "[I]f the constitutional conception of equal protection
of the laws means anything, it must at the very least mean that
a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest." . ..
64. See id. at 624.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 635.
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The primary rationale the state offers for Amendment 2 is
respect for other citizens' freedom of association, and in
particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have
personal or religious objections to homosexuality .... The
breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these
particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit
them ... [Amendment 2] is a status-based enactment divorced
from any factual context from which we could discern a
relationship to legitimate state interests ....
We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexu-
als not to further a proper legislative end but to make them
unequal to everyone else [and] ... a stranger to [Colorado's]
laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause
67
Federal judges, legal scholars, and the lawyers who deal
frequently with legal issues concerning homosexuals differ about
the meaning of Romer.6 Has the Supreme Court weakened, or
even overturned, Bowers without actually saying so? Is "don't ask,
don't tell" threatened? Some law professors and practicing lawyers
see Romer as signaling the doom of Bowers and the military's
homosexual policy.69 I am among those who read Romer more
67. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-35.
68. See, e.g., Timothy M. Tymkovich et al., A Tale of Three Theories: Reason and
Prejudice in the Battle Over Amendment 2, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 287 (1997) (placing Romer
in its political, social, and litigation contexts, concluding that the Romer majority opinion is
an example of ad hoc activist jurisprudence without constitutional mooring); Mark E.
Papadopoulos, Inkblot Jurisprudence: Romer v. Evans as a Great Defeat for the Gay Rights
Movement, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y., 165, 201 (1997) (concluding that Romer is
ambiguous like a Rohrshach inkblot, and that three separate readings "have emerged: (1)
Romer overruled Bowers v. Hardwick; (2) Romer distinguished Bowers; (3) Romer and
Bowers will work side-by-side to defeat different constitutional challenges by homosexuals")
Papadopoulos believes that the third reading is the strongest and most logical at this point.
See id. But see Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1436 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J. dissenting).
Judge Fletcher stated that Romer implicitly rejects the contention that moral disapproval of
homosexuality creates a legitimate state interest justifying discrimination. See id. Otherwise
discrimination could always be justified by the moral disapproval of the majority. See id.
69. See, e.g., Thomas G. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished,, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
373 (1997); Samuel A. Marcossan, Romer and the Limits of Legitimacy: Stripping Opponents
of Gay and Lesbian Rights of Their "First Line of Defense" in the Same Sex Marriage Fight,
24 J. CONTEMP. L. 217, 232-34 (1998) (arguing that Romer contradicts the broad anti-gay
reading of Bowers and will eventually lead to overruling its holding on sodomy.); Duncan,
supra note 52, at 348 n.13; Richard C. Reuben, Gay Rights Watershed [Romer v. Evans],
A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 30.
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narrowly to focus on procedural discrimination against homosexu-
als--on singling them out and denying them access to the ordinary
processes for changing the law.7" Read in this way, Romer does
not inevitably undermine Bowers or threaten the armed forces
policy on homosexuality.
Note that I said Romer does not inevitably pose those dangers.
Unfortunately there are ideas and language in Justice Kennedy's
opinion that may foreshadow the demise of Bowers and show that
some justices may be willing to substitute their own judgment for
that of Congress and the Executive Branch regarding the wisdom
of "don't ask, don't tell." When "don't ask, don't tell" eventually
reaches the Supreme Court, is a majority likely to find that the
moral and utilitarian justifications, which are the foundation for the
policy, amount to nothing more than "animosity"-a catering to the
irrational prejudices of servicemen and women and their leaders?71
In other words, will the Justices agree or disagree with Judge
Nickerson's decision in Able72 and with the four dissenters in
Thomasson?7 3 Or, might they proceed on another tack and
conclude that, while there are legitimate justifications for treating
homosexuals differently than non-homosexuals, the policy is not
sufficiently tailored to those reasons?
V. Responding to Romer: Defending "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
What should the Justice and Defense Departments, the
President, and Congress do now to guard against defeat in the
Supreme Court? Unless the government reinforces its position and
changes tactics when defending "don't ask, don't tell," there is a
danger that a majority of the Supreme Court will take sides in the
culture wars and find that all or much of "don't ask, don't tell"
violates the Constitutional guaranty of equal protection. Justice
Scalia, dissenting in Romer, accuses the majority of mistaking a
"Kulturkampf for a fit of spite."74 Justice Scalia is not inclined to
70. See Duncan, supra note 52, at 346-49; Jonathan S. Bauer, Note, Applications to Gay
Rights and Beyond, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), 76 NEB. L. REV. 352, 368-69
(1997). See also Lynn A. Baker, The Missing Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v.
Evans, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 387, 407-408 (1997) (arguing that Romer and Bowers can be
reconciled and that the problem with Amendment 2 was its sheer breadth).
71. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
72. See supra notes 18 and 19 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
74. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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read the majority's decision narrowly; he asserts that the court in
Romer is contradicting Bowers and placing the prestige of the
Supreme Court "behind the proposition that opposition to
homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias."75
Since the United States Constitution is silent on the subject, he
maintains, and I agree, that such a basic conflict should "be
resolved by normal democratic means ...."" The courts have
"no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored
by the elite class" of lawyers and law professors from whom federal
judges are chosen.77
The government must do whatever it can within the parame-
ters of Able and all other pending and future litigation, by either
introducing evidence or supplementing the arguments in its briefs,
to establish that the underlying purpose of the policy is to acknowl-
edge and foster a unifying moral belief that homosexual behavior
is wrong. The government should stress institutional morality as
the more relevant of the two moralities described in this essay: the
institutional morality of the armed forces and the moral values of
its individual members.
The casual way in which the Romer majority inferred that
people who voted for Colorado's Amendment 2 were motivated by
animosity toward and a bare desire to harm homosexuals is a
warning that the government cannot be content with unsupported,
general assertions of moral motives and denials of animosity.78
The government must strongly counter arguments made by
opposing counsel that equate righteous disapproval to undeserved
prejudice. That idea is already embedded in the thinking of federal
judges like Judge Nickerson.79
The most ardently liberal federal judges can fairly be included
in what Peter Steinfels, religion editor of the New York Times, has
named the "lifestyle left."8 He identifies the lifestyle left, which
consists of both religious and non-religious people, as the opposite
of the "religious right." The lifestyle left consists of groups and
individuals, such as the ACLU and gay rights organizations,
ideologically dedicated to pushing the envelope of socially
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also Murphy, supra note 35, at 695 n.26.
78. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35.
79. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
80. See Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1996, at A29.
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acceptable lifestyles.8" They are not content with the separation
of church and state; they seem hell-bent on increasing the estrange-
ment between law and traditional morality.
The government position would be greatly strengthened if the
Defense Department or Congress were to conduct hearings,
specifically find that homosexual behavior offends the institutional
morality of the military, and add that finding to the regulations or
statute. Such a finding would make it extremely difficult for the
courts to gloss over questions of (i) the extent to which moral
considerations can justify "don't ask, don't tell" and (ii) just how
much deference the judiciary owes to the political branches of
government on this military and moral issue.
One commentator sees Romer as marking a watershed:
American jurists stand in the unique position of being able to
choose the direction in which the law will proceed. At this
point, there is an arguably sufficient level of precedent to justify
the continued enactment of morality legislation, but there is an
equally well-established body of law to support the decreased
use of morality as a justification for law.82
However close the question may be with regard to civilian
law,83 there are persuasive reasons for accepting the institutional
81. See id.; cf. Lino A. Graglia, Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again By the
Constitution, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 427 (1997) (arguing that gaining full approval of
homosexuality is today's cause celebre in legal academia).
82. S.I. Strong, Romer v. Evans and the Permissibility of Morality Legislation, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1259, 1312-13 (1997); see also Steven A. Delchin, Comment, Scalia 18:22: Thou Shall
Not Lie With the Academic and Law School Elite; It is an Abomination-Romer v. Evans and
America's Culture War, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 207 (1996). A key battle is being fought
over the question of whether traditional religious moral beliefs may properly enter into
formulation of public policy. See id. at 242. Historically and philosophically, religion has an
important role in making law. See id. at 242-52.
83. For citation and discussion of modern cases that explicitly refer to the relation of
morality and law, see Woodruff, supra note 3, at 166. But see Strong, supra note 36, at 44-46
(discussing caselaw and arguing that moral disapproval of disfavored groups is not a proper
basis for law under constitutional and jurisprudential principles). The Woodruff article is an
excellent, comprehensive treatment of the military's homosexual personnel policy. Professor
Woodruff, a retired colonel and former chief of the Army's litigation office, argues that 10
U.S.C § 654, the "don't ask, don't tell" statute, is constitutional but that the implementing
departmental regulations are inconsistent with the statute in important ways. See Woodruff
supra note 3, at 178. Six of the judges in Thomasson v. Perry were persuaded by this
argument and voted to uphold "don't ask, don't tell," solely on statutory grounds, holding
that a service member could be separated simply for declaring he is gay. See Thomasson v.
Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 931 (4th Cir. 1996). They in effect accused the administration of pulling
its punches when implementing and defending the policy. See id. at 934-35. (Luttig, J.,
concurring).
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morality of the armed forces as a proper basis for military law and
policy. For one thing the arguments made by Lord Patrick Devlin
in his celebrated exchange with Professor H. L. A. Hart are even
more cogent when applied to the military. Lord Devlin, discussing
the repeal of Britain's sodomy law, maintained:
What makes a society of any sort is a community of
ideas ... [including ideas about morality] .... If men and
women try to create a society in which there is no fundamental
agreement about good and evil they will fail; if ... the agree-
ment goes the society will disintegrate ....
Common lawyers used to say that Christianity was part of the
law of the land. That was never more than a piece of rheto-
ric .... What lay behind it was the notion that mor-
als ... were necessary to the temporal order8s
Lord Devlin believed that society may use legislation to protect its
core moral values. The use of law is even easier to justify in the
armed forces where discipline, order, and unit cohesion trump
individual autonomy and self-expression. Congress and the
President can impose restraints to preserve values that are deemed
important by most experienced officers and NCOs.
When defending "don't ask, don't tell," the Justice and
Defense Departments should draw heavily on what Justice Scalia
says in Romer about the relation of law to morality. Justice Scalia
maintains that a popular majority is entitled to preserve its
traditional moral values through legislation.8 5  This was the
rationale of Bowers. He distinguishes between traditional moral
disapproval and pointless or unworthy "animus., 8 6  Moral
disapproval may supply a reasonable basis for legislation disfavor-
ing homosexuals-unworthy animus cannot.8 7 This distinction is
reflected in the differences between Bowers and the earlier case of
City of Cleberne v. Cleberne Living Center.as The discrimination
84. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9-10 (1965). For a more
complete exposition of Lord Devlin's ideas see Feldblum, supra note 7 at 312-20. Professor
Feldblum proposes that advocates of homosexual rights educate the public on the moral
good of homosexual love and couplings so that the advocates eventually can support their
positions with morality-based arguments. See id. at 331-35.
85. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 644-45.
88. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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found unconstitutional in Cleberne was discrimination against
mentally retarded people.8 9 This was discrimination inspired by
unworthy animus, not by moral disapproval.
Sometimes the federal judges who find that "don't ask, don't
tell" caters to the animus, animosity, or irrational prejudice of
service members treat moral disapproval of homosexuality as per
se animus.9' These judges are not drawing the distinction between
moral disapproval and unworthy animus that Scalia and his fellow
dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, did. The
challenge for the government is to convince a majority of the court
to draw that distinction. Even if a majority is reluctant to endorse
the moral disapproval/unworthy animus dichotomy as a general
principle, they ought to endorse it in a military context. Justice
Blackmun, a dissenter in Bowers v. Hardwick who rejected the
majority's morality rationale,9" acknowledged in another case that
the military has its own code of honor and that military law can
embody the judgment of the military community about what is
honorable, decent, and right.92
Sometimes the judges who find that "don't ask, don't tell"
caters to animus seem to go along with Scalia's dichotomy.
However, they comb through the legislative history and conclude
that "don't ask, don't tell" in fact caters to the animus of all ranks
and .grades. These judges draw their conclusions from items like
testimony in the Senate hearings by a plain-spoken retired admiral
that homosexuals engage in a "filthy, disease-ridden practice" and
are "inherently promiscuous."93  The government can deal with
this judicial fact finding approach by urging the morality-based
arguments suggested in this essay and the earlier What About
Morality? essay.94 The Justice and Defense Departments should
also search the legislative history for additional evidence to counter
any claim that "don't ask, don't tell" caters to a pointless hate of
89. See id. at 448.
90. See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that the
government's claim that the presence of known homosexuals would raise concerns of
heterosexual service members which were based on moral precepts and ethical values is a
confession that the policy caters to prejudices of heterosexuals).
91. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 764-65 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(defendant officer had been convicted by court martial of publicly urging negro enlisted men
to refuse to serve in Vietnam).
93. See Thomasson v Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 951 (4th Cir. 1996) (Hall, C.J., dissenting).
94. See generally Murphy et al., supra note 1.
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homosexuals or other unworthy animus. But once again, the ideal
response to the argument that "don't ask, don't tell" caters to hate
and homophobia would be for Congress and the Defense Depart-
ment to determine whether there is a moral as well as utilitarian
basis for the policy. Legislative and administrative fact finding is
a more suitable and reliable process than judicial fact finding for
determining this issue of morality/animus.
VI. Responding to Romer: Amending "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
In Romer, Justice Kennedy criticized Amendment 2 on another
ground-the deprivation it imposed on homosexuals seemed to be
needlessly broad.95 The amendment was not even roughly tailored
to the justifications claimed by the state; for instance, the claim that
the amendment was meant to ensure "respect for other citizens'
freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords
or employers who have personal or religious objections to homo-
sexuality."96 What Justice Kennedy says in Romer suggests that
the Defense Department and Congress ought to consider whether
"don't ask, don't tell" is suitably tailored to the purposes that it is
meant to serve. Are its sweeping constraints unnecessarily broad?
Should Congress modify the policy immediately to reduce the risk
that it will be overturned by the Supreme Court or should Congress
wait to seee what the Court does?
There is little risk that the Supreme Court will find "don't ask,
don't tell" to be inadequately tailored if the government does add
institutional morality to the utilitarian justifications for the policy.
The policy would easily meet the minimal requirements of the
rational basis test. Of course, the correlation between the policy
and its purposes would become much more critical if the Supreme
Court backs away from the equal protection implications of Bowers
and decides that homosexuals are a suspect or a quasi-suspect
class.97 Although the moral and utilitarian purposes of the policy
would amount to a compelling national interest, the government
might have a hard time convincing the Court that the equal
protection and free speech provisions of the Constitution permit
95. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1996).
96. Id. at 635.
97. See Feldblum, supra note 7 at 242,246-98 (discussing equal protection jurisprudence,
distinguishing Bowers, and maintaining that sexual orientation should be regarded as a
suspect class).
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the discharge, regardless of circumstances, of every gay and lesbian
who indulges in romantic or erotic behavior or talking about his or
her sex life.
During the 1993 congressional hearings I proposed a compro-
mise policy of "tolerance and containment" to the Pentagon, the
House and Senate armed services committees, and the White
House.98 My compromise would have placed constraints on
homosexual behavior and speech that, while substantial, were less
total and more realistic than "don't ask, don't tell." My proposal
would have allowed homosexuals to have a discreet sex life, and to
speak about their sexuality, in circumstances that were so far
removed from a military environment and their military status and
duties that there would be very little risk of prejudice to good
order and discipline or of harm to the self-image and reputation of
the armed forces. "Bisexuals," however, would not be allowed
even a discreet dual sex life. They do have greater freedom of
choice and would be expected to settle for either a heterosexual or
homosexual identity. Two active duty officers, a brigadier general
and a colonel, with whom I discussed the proposal agreed that a
policy of tolerance and containment would neither give the
impression of condoning homosexual behavior, nor significantly
endanger military capability and combat effectiveness. However,
the responses I received to the proposal indicated that key decision
makers, except for Chairman Ron Dellums of the House Armed
Services Committee,99 were not ready to consider any alternative
more lenient to homosexuals than "don't ask, don't tell." My
suggested policy reprinted in Appendix B may be worth consider-
ing in light of the Romer decision.
My suggested policy also may deserve another look because of
the constant criticism of "don't ask, don't tell" by gay rights
advocates and the media1"0 and the increasing political, social, and
cultural acceptance of the homosexual lifestyle.1"1 Five or ten
years from now-even if "don't ask, don't tell" has been upheld by
the Supreme Court-there may be irresistible political pressure to
scrap the policy for being too harsh.
98. For the complete text of this proposal, see infra Appendix B.
99. In his letter of May 28, 1993, Chairman Dellums wrote, "I commend you for your
hard work on a proposal that I found thoughtful and well articulated. You can be sure that
the committee will consider your views .... "
100. See supra notes 6 and 8 and accompanying text.
101. See generally, e. g., Goldberg, supra note 43.
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A compromise policy could probably be devised that would be
satisfactory now and for the foreseeable future to homosexual
servicemen and women who are more interested in being good
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines than in promoting the
homosexual cause. A well-designed compromise policy would
surely detract less from military capability and be easier to
administer than "don't ask, don't tell" if the armed forces one day
find themselves needing to draw heavily on the homosexual
population to meet requirements for manpower or particular skills.
This could happen during a national emergency if the forces were
greatly expanded and the draft restored.
Let me suggest possible changes other than those proposed in
Appendix B:
a. A very lenient homosexual personnel policy might be
modeled on the rules and practices for dealing with
members accused of adultery. The adultery policy in
essence calls for commanders to intervene only in egre-
gious cases that involve a particularized military inter-
est."0
b. A feature of any new policy (or of an amended "don't ask,
don't tell" policy) might be to give homosexuals the
opportunity to obtain advice, on a confidential basis, from
a service lawyer, chaplain, or doctor. 3 All advice con-
cerning the requirements of the policy would be candid,
reliable, and not calculated to help the individual circum-
vent the restrictions of the policy. The chaplain's counsel-
ing presumably would be pastoral in nature and consonant
with the religious faith of the chaplain and the individual.
All other counseling would be non-coercive and would
encourage responsible, healthy, and preferably abstinent
behavior, with any bias leaning towards heterosexuality.
It is a mistake to leave counseling of homosexual person-
102. Regarding service member adultery, see, e.g., William T. Barton, the Scarlet letter and
the Military Justice System, THE ARMY LAWYER (Aug. 1997) (DA. PAM 27-50-297) 3, 8
(conviction for adultery requires proof that under the circumstances the conduct was
prejudicial to good order and discipline, or had a tendency to bring discredit upon the armed
forces, or in the case of an officer charged under Article 133 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), was unbecoming conduct); Philip Shenon, Military Rules on
Morality Are Defended, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1997, at A14; Mark Thompson, Sex, The Army
and a Double Standard, TIME, May 4, 1998, at 30; see also Steven L. Myers, Military
Weighing Changes in Policy Toward Adultery, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1998 at 1 (discussing
changes being considered that would make the policy more lenient).
103. See Murphy et al., supra note 1 at 351 n.80-81.
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nel, and the sexually confused and uncertain, entirely to
surreptitious meetings with liberal promoters of gay rights.
c. A new policy, consistent with a philosophy of tolerance
and containment, might be identical to "don't ask, don't
tell" with one major exception-the policy would establish
a defense of immunity if the putative violation occurred in
certain clearly defined circumstances. The defense would
not be meant to recognize a moral right to engage in
homosexual behavior. Rather, it would be a realistic
concession to human weakness and the relative immutabili-
ty of true homosexuality. If a homosexual (defined to
exclude a practicing bisexual) engaged in homoerotic
conduct or disclosed his homosexuality under the defined
circumstances he or she would not, by reason of that
behavior, be subject to punishment or administrative
discharge regardless of who happened to learn of the
behavior.
The draftsmen of the immunity defense might consider
incorporating the following ideas:
(1) There should never be immunity for violations of
"don't ask, don't tell" occurring on a military installa-
tion, ship, aircraft, vehicle or in any place within 25
miles of the actor's duty station.
(2) There should never be immunity, regardless of
where it occurs, for engaging in homoerotic conduct
with, or confiding homosexual identity to, a member
of the same unit or headquarters to which the actor
is assigned.
(3) There should never be immunity if the homosex-
ual behavior is a violation of currently enforced, local
civilian law.
(4) Except as provided in (1), (2) and (3), there will
be immunity for homoerotic conduct, including sexual
intercourse, that occurs in a residence, hotel or
comparably private place.
(5) Except as provided in (1), (2) and (3) there will
be immunity for public behavior or speech that
reveals homosexual affection or identity if:
(i) the actor is not in uniform or otherwise
advertising his military status; and
(ii) the actor reasonably believes that no mem-
ber of the unit or headquarters to which he or
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she is assigned is present or likely to learn of the
behavior or speech.
A number of compromises can be imagined that would
improve the situation of homosexual men and women without
posing a significant threat to the military's interests in distancing
itself from open, active homosexuality."M  Although such a
compromise would be acceptable to many homosexual servicemen
and women, no compromise is likely to satisfy gay activists and the
"lifestyle left."1 5  Complete integration of the military is a
priority item on their agenda, although few of them would ever
choose a military career for themselves. They want the armed
forces to treat homosexuals and heterosexuals the same and to
teach all servicemen and women to regard the behavior of gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals as perfectly normal.
10 6
VII. Conclusions
In the courts, media, and scholarly journals, a recurring
argument by the opponents of "don't ask, don't tell" has been that
the policy caters to the animus/irrational prejudice of heterosexual
servicemen. The Justice and Defense Departments have not made
a concerted effort to counter this argument by insisting that the
policy is grounded in a moral belief that homosexual behavior is
wrong and that, in the world of the military, homosexuality is
looked on as a character defect or an unfortunate compulsion. The
policy's defenders have been largely content to plug away with
pragmatic arguments derived from congressional findings about the
disruptive effect that the presence of known homosexuals would
104. The compromises proposed in subsection c and Appendix B can be defended as
compatible with natural law. These compromises can be reached by reasoning from premises
about human nature and basic goods that are derived from common knowledge and intuition.
The moral conclusions drawn from the reasoning are tempered with prudential consider-
ations, such as practical and political expediency, when converting them into law. See Mur-
phy, supra note 35, at 701. For an enlightening discussion about the methodology and merits
of natural law and the relation between moral philosophy and civil liberties, see generally
ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL (1993).
105. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
106. See SULLIVAN, supra note 45, at 173-78. See generally Diane H. Mazur, The Un-
known Soldier: A Critique of "Gays in the Military" Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 223 (1996) (arguing that homosexual service members are unknown soldiers
to commentators, litigators, and activists who purport to be on their side, and that arguments
on their behalf are often artificial and counterproductive because they focus on "political"
matters like status and "coming out" rather than on freedom to experience intimacy in their
lives).
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have on things like morale, good order, discipline, unit cohesion,
and privacy. This strategy has been working in the sense that the
policy has thus far survived equal protection and free speech
attacks in the federal appeal courts."° However, this strategy has
not been persuasive enough to forestall vigorous dissents in the
appellate courts and decisions by district court judges that the
policy, or some aspect of it, is unconstitutional.0 8 After Romer,
one cannot be certain that a government strategy of relying solely
on utilitarian arguments will prevail in the Supreme Court.
The armed forces deserve a homosexual personnel policy of
undoubted constitutionally. The rationale of "don't ask, don't tell"
will be stronger if the government relies on Bowers and adds
institutional morality to its pragmatic arguments. While doing so,
the government must help the courts avoid doctrinal error and
semantic confusion about the meaning and relevance of "ani-
mus." °9  Justice Scalia is correct in his Romer dissent when he
distinguishes between traditional moral disapproval of homosexuali-
ty and "pointless, hate-filled, gay-bashing" animus.1 Moral
disapproval can justify or help justify "don't ask, don't tell,"
unworthy animus cannot.
In assessing whether there is moral disapproval of homosexual-
ity in the armed forces the terms "moral" and "disapproval" must
both be broadly construed. This essay suggests that the institution-
al morality of the military be conceived as the belief of a majority
of the experienced members of the officer and non-commissioned
officer corps about what is right and wrong behavior for a service
person. The "disapproval" of individual members may be passion-
ate or dispassionate. Ideally, Congress and the Defense Depart-
ment should add institutional morality to the explicit purposes of
the policy set out in the "don't ask, don't tell" statute and in the
implementing regulations.111
Sooner or later, the military's policy towards homosexuals will
have to become more lenient."' The armed forces regularly
107. See e.g., Philips v. Perry 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d
915 (4th Cir. 1996); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996).
108. See, e.g., Phillips, 106 F.3d 1420; Thomasson, 80 F.3d 915, Able v. United States, 968
F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
109. See supra footnote 90 and accompanying text.
110. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996).
111. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 55, 57-58, 60, 75-76, 78-79 and accompanying text. Of course, the
military could try to maintain its present strict "don't ask, don't tell" policy-a homosexual
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engage in secret contingency war planning. If the military is not
already doing so, it should begin to identify and evaluate alterna-
tive plans for its next engagement on the homosexuality front. The
goal of any potential replacement for "don't ask, don't tell" should
be to maintain the institutional morality and the effectiveness of
the military while being realistic and fair in the treatment of
homosexuals. At least one potential replacement policy ought to
be designed around the principle of tolerance and containment.1 3
This planning task should be assigned to one or more of the
academies or advanced service schools, rather than to a Pentagon
committee or a civilian think-tank. The faculty members of the
military, naval and air force academies, the war colleges, and the
judge advocate generals' schools are objective, practical scholars
removed from Washington political pressures. They are educated
in many disciplines and are experts on military culture and
character and the functions of the armed forces. They are qualified
to sketch or draft statutes and regulations to implement possible
replacement policies and to present the alternative policies in their
legal, social, moral, political, and practical contexts.
Let me end this essay about military morality and homosexual
personnel policy with the words of a British military historian:
Soldiers are not as other men ... [War] ... must be fought by
men whose values and skills are not those of politicians and
diplomats. They are those of a world apart, a very ancient
world, which exists in parallel with the every day world but does
not belong to it. Both worlds change over time and the warrior
world adapts in step to the civilian. It follows it, however, at a
distance. The distance can never be closed for the culture of
the warrior can never be that of civilization itself.
14
who wants to serve in the armed forces can comply only by remaining 100% celibate and in
the closet. Whether the military could do this indefinitely depends upon whether it could
retain the support of Congress, the President, and the courts as well as upon the progress of
the cultural struggle on the homosexuality front.
113. For a discussion of the principle of tolerance and containment as it would apply in
civilian law, see Murphy, supra note 35. The putative legal principle and popular
conservative slogan "no special rights for gays" is meaningless when dealing with the issue
of gays in the military. "No special rights for gays" masks two frequently irreconcilable
goals-treating homosexuals the same as heterosexuals and preserving the status quo.
. 114. JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE, Intro. xvi (1994); see also David Stout,
An Army as Good as Its People and Vice Versa, N.Y.TIMES, July 26, 1998, at WK1 (discuss-
ing the inevitability and need for cultural differences between the military and civilian society
in America).
APPENDIX A
EXCERPTS FROM 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994)
§ 654 Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces
(a) Findings - Congress makes the following findings:
(b) Policy. - A member of the armed forces shall be separated
from the armed forces under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Defense if one or more of the following findings is
made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in such
regulations:
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in,
or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts
unless there are further findings, made and approved in
accordance with procedures set forth in such regulations, that
the member has demonstrated that-
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual
and customary behavior;
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely
to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force,
coercion, or intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the
member's continued presence in the armed forces is
consistent with the interests of the armed forces in proper
discipline, good order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts.
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual
or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further
finding, made and approved in accordance with procedures set
forth in the regulations, that the member has demonstrated that
he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in,
has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosex-
ual acts.
(3) The member has married or attempted to marry a person
known to be of the same biological sex.
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(c) Entry standards and documents - (1) The Secretary of Defense
shall ensure that the standards for enlistment and appointment of
members of the armed forces reflect the policies set forth in
subsection (b).
(f) Definitions - In this section:
(1) The term "homosexual" means a person, regardless of sex,
who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts, and
includes the terms "gay" and "lesbian."
(3) The term "homosexual act" means -
(A) any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between members of the same sex for the
purpose of satisfying sexual desires; and
(B) any bodily contact which a reasonable person would
understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to
engage in an act described in subparagraph (A).
APPENDIX B
The author sent this letter to Senator Sam Nunn and other
interested parties while the issue of gays in the military was being
studied and negotiated by congressional committees, the defense
department and the president. The letter sketches a policy of
tolerance and containment that would allow known, non-celibate
homosexuals to serve in the military under substantial constraints.
May 17, 1993
Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6050
Re: DOD Policy Regarding Homosexuality
Dear Senator Nunn:
On January 27, 1993, I sent you a copy of an essay that I had
written with John Ellington entitled Homosexuality and the Law:
Tolerance and Containment. In your reply of March 5th you
invited me to submit my views about Defense Department policy
regarding homosexuality.
About my credentials - I have split the last fifty years about
evenly between the military and law school teaching.
I will skip over my experience with homosexuality in the Army
- my anecdotes go back a long way and could add little to the
information you have already gathered. The two law review
articles that I am enclosing should be more useful than anecdotes.
Even though neither directly addresses the problem facing your
Committee, I believe that both are very relevant. The articles
supplement the observations and suggestions that I sketch in this
letter. The first enclosure, Homosexuality and the Law: Tolerance
and Containment II, is an expanded, documented version of the
essay I sent you last January; it will be published in the Summer
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issue of the Dickinson Law Review. I wrote the second enclosed
article, The Soldier's Right to a Private Life [ 24 Mil. L. Rev. 97]
for the Military Law Review in 1964 while still in the Army. Some
of the particulars are out-of-date, but I think that the fundamental
concepts are timeless and important (see e.g., pp. 97-102, 122-24).
Getting down to business, these are my views:
1. For a great many reasons, a homosexual orientation
is a handicap in America's relatively small, all-volunteer, armed
forces. Furthermore, it is undesirable for any service member to
engage in sexual activity with someone of the same sex, regardless
of whether the member's orientation is entirely homosexual,
entirely heterosexual or something in between (e.g., bisexual,
undiscriminatingly hedonistic, ambivalent or confused). However,
it is possible for homosexuals to manage their lifestyle and behavior
(without remaining celibate for thirty years) so that they do not
adversely affect their value to the service. Similarly, my generaliza-
tion that same-sex sexual activity is undesirable needs to be
qualified. The circumstances under which the activity occurs may
so negate or attenuate its connection or threat to service interests
that the activity should be regarded as private, excusable or de
minimis.
2. Allow me to suggest a compromise approach that I
believe (i) would make it possible for known gays and lesbians to
serve, (ii) would not appreciably degrade the quality and effective-
ness of the armed forces and might even have a net beneficial
effect from the fact that the services and homosexuals would be
dealing candidly with each other, and (iii) would not be unduly
difficult to put into place and to administer. The approach I am
proposing can be characterized as a policy of tolerance and
containment. It would require some changes in the current policy
of "don't ask - don't tell."
3. As I understand the current policy, one object is to
make it easier for homosexuals to enter and remain undetected in
the armed forces. The services, and their agents, do not aggressive-
ly seek out homosexuals but if certain unequivocal indications of an
individual's homosexual orientation come to official notice, he or
she is subject to administrative separation. The current policy
involves a gamble for both the armed forces and homosexual
members: the policy is fair in the sense that voluntary choice and
mutual risk make gambling fair. But the policy may be unfair in
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other ways and have undesirable costs and consequences, to both
the forces and the homosexual member. For example, in the
accession process the armed forces lose some of their ability to
screen out homosexuals who are unlikely to fit into service life.
Also, prospective officers and enlistees, even when told about the
current policy, are likely not to foresee or fully appreciate the risks,
dilemmas, dissembling and stress that twenty years, or three years,
of living in the closet may entail. They may misjudge their own
capacity to endure, much less thrive in, such a precarious existence.
The ultimate hard case, under current and former policy, is one in
which an otherwise exemplary soldier, who has served many years
but is not eligible to retire, is summarily discharged because his
homosexuality comes to light.
4. Under the policy of tolerance and containment that I
propose the services (i) would ask prospective officers and enlisted
persons about their sexual orientation - they would be expected to
give honest answers, (ii) would screen out individuals who seem
clearly incapable of complying with service requirements for
managing their lifestyle and conduct, (iii) would screen out
individuals who are clearly pathological homophobes, (iv) would
allow admitted and known homosexuals to enter and remain in the
service, (v) after an individual enters the service, would treat the
member's homosexuality as a matter of very limited official concern
and something the member should keep to himself or herself and
(vi) would regulate same-sex sexual conduct, and the kind of
behavior that is associated with a homosexual lifestyle, to the very
substantial extent necessary for a first-rate American armed forces.
5. Although "known" homosexuals would be allowed to
serve, their homosexuality should be kept as private as possible.
Official information about an individual's homosexuality should be
disclosed only on a very strict "need-to-know" basis: for example,
when relevant to a military or civilian criminal investigation or if
the individual is a candidate for one of a few particularly sensitive
assignments, or when an individual who has had trouble managing
his homosexuality is being considered for promotion. Homosexual
members would be made to understand that they must manage
their homosexuality so that it does not adversely affect their own
performance of duty, the discipline, cohesion, esprit and effective-
ness of their units, and the morale and tranquility of other service
members. If they compromise their value to the forces by engaging
in forbidden or imprudent behavior their careers will suffer or may
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be cut short. Homosexuals should be told to be circumspect in
choosing the people to whom they admit their homosexuality. Gay
pride has to be muted: reticence is the norm.
6. On the other hand, a gay or lesbian should not be held
accountable for a problem which he or she played no culpable role
in creating. A homosexual member should not have to sacrifice
self-respect to avoid conflict provoked by someone else. For
example, a gay sailor should not have to lie about his sexual
orientation, unless he prefers to do so, to placate a bullying
shipmate. The effect of the approach that I advocate would
probably be to keep most gays and lesbians pretty much in the
closet - the outcome that gay advocates predict would follow if
each individual were free to decide for himself how "open" to be
about his gayness. My policy would officially, and more surely,
inhibit gays and lesbians from "coming out" in a destructive way.
It would nevertheless allow them to serve honestly, honorably, and
without anxiety, under substantial constraints that are imposed for
the good of the armed forces.
7. Some new legislation and executive orders, and quite
a few new service regulations and directives, would be needed to
implement the policy of tolerance and containment that I am
describing. A manual for leaders and a handbook for homosexual
service members could be very helpful. These laws, directives and
manuals:
a. When read together, should constitute a candidly stated,
comprehensive implementation of the policy of tolerance and
containment. (Avoid ambiguity, don't leave troublesome issues
unresolved and to be worked out later.)
b. Should treat homosexual conduct separately from heterosexual
whenever appropriate. (Recognize that the problems can be
different, e.g., the "house rules" for on-post family quarters,
bachelor apartments, and guest houses probably should forbid
same-sex sexual intercourse but be silent regarding unmarried,
male-female intercourse.)
c. Should make a clear distinction between rules of conduct that
subject violators to punitive, administrative or other formal
sanctions and ethical norms and rules of etiquette for which there
are no sanctions or only informal sanctions. (This, of course, is a
drafting problem when writing any official pronouncement intended
to influence behavior. It is likely to be extra troublesome when
dealing with matters that involve morality.)
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d. Should define the acts of voluntary sodomy and other lewd
conduct by a member with another person of the same sex that are
criminal because committed under circumstances likely to prejudice
good order and discipline or to bring discredit upon the armed
forces, e.g., chain of command, barracks or shipboard sex.
e. Should define and authorize punitive or administrative
sanctions for sexual harassment by, or of, a homosexual service
member. (Be careful of this one!)
f. Should forbid or discourage homosexuals from engaging in any
lewd, romantic, militant or freakish conduct or speech (i.e.,
behavior that is a manifestation of a gay or lesbian lifestyle and
likely to offend straight service men and women) if the conduct
occurs under circumstances likely to have an appreciable, adverse
effect on the interests of the armed forces. Particularly egregious
kinds of conduct that are likely to prejudice good order and
discipline or discredit the armed forces should be made criminal
and subject to punishment.
8. With particular reference to sodomy and the UCMJ -
All the acts of voluntary sodomy that are referred to in 7d. above
are already punishable, or could be made punishable, by armed
forces regulations under the existing Articles 92, 133 or 134.
Article 125, the current sodomy statute, would need to be amend-
ed. I suggest that Congress consider the following factors when
revising 125, regardless of how the gays-in-the-military issue is
resolved.
a. Involuntary sodomy, voluntary sodomy with a person of the
same sex, voluntary sodomy with a person of opposite sex, and
bestiality ought to be dealt with separately.
b. The proscription of voluntary, opposite sex sodomy under
Article 125 should probably be eliminated. Such conduct would
then be punished only in certain specified circumstances under
Articles 92, 133 or 134 (compare para. 7d, above).
c. The two best ways in which Article 125 could treat voluntary
same-sex sodomy are either to
(1) Eliminate it as a crime, thus permitting same-sex sodomy to be
punished only under Articles 92, 133 or 134.
or
(2) Retain it as a universal proscription (i.e., applicable every-
where, at all times) by adding a section to Article 125 comparable
to the voluntary, same-sex sodomy statute that I describe in my
enclosed Dickinson Law Review piece. In essence, the amendment
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to Article 125 would generally make it a crime for a person subject
to military law to engage in voluntary same-sex sodomy. It would
be a defense, however, if an accused member proved that he or she
was a true homosexual and that the other person was either a true
homosexual, or reasonably believed by the accused to be one. The
rationale for this kind of sodomy article would be that it is
consistent with the traditional and current moral values of military
personnel, and furthers the pragmatic interests of the forces (e.g.,
promoting discipline, the service's image and AIDS control) while
being fair to those members whose homosexual conduct may be
regarded, depending upon one's viewpoint, to be natural and right
for them or to be an unfortunate but tolerable shortcoming.
9. With the exceptions described above, homosexuals
should be governed by the same rules and entitled to the same
protection, benefits and treatment as their straight counterparts -
no more and no less. They should be treated like, and made to
feel like, part of one team. Disobedience and disrespect to gay or
lesbian superiors as well as violence, harassment or gross incivility
towards any service member because he or she is homosexual
should be punished or corrected as appropriate. The services
should not provide separate clubs or other separate facilities for
gays and lesbians; nor should the services provide on-post housing
and other benefits to the partner of a gay or lesbian service
member. In my curbstone opinion, the fear that the armed forces
will have to provide quarters, PX privileges and other on-post
benefits to a gay member's mate if the marriage is valid under state
law, is unfounded. Congress could constitutionally exempt the
armed forces from providing those benefits that would be harmful
to good order and discipline. In short, the armed forces should not
go beyond tolerance and should do nothing special that might
encourage, or be construed to endorse, homosexuality as an
alternative way of life for military personnel.
10. I believe that the kind of tolerance and containment
policy sketched above is really no more complex and has no more
inherent difficulties than the current policy of "don't ask - don't
tell." Actually the two have a lot in common: current policy could
be labeled a policy of "tacit tolerance and containment," while my
policy could be described as "don't ask much - don't flaunt." Much
of the action required for implementing my policy would have to
be taken to implement the cryptic "don't ask - don't tell" approach
(e.g., drafting comprehensive laws, regulations and guidance like
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those described in paras. 7 and 8 above). The special advantages
of my suggested policy - both for the armed forces and for the gay
or lesbian individual who wants to serve our country - are advan-
tages that come from the policy's emphasis on candor and fairness.
11. I can envisage variants of my particular policy of
tolerance and containment: my policy could be blended in some
fashion with the current compromise. For example, a policy of
"don't ask - don't tell" could apply to the accession process and the
first three years of a homosexual's service. After that period
(during which the member could, in effect, demonstrate the ability
to manage conduct and lifestyle), a policy of tolerance and
containment would apply. The member would not be subject to a
discharge merely because he or she disclosed homosexuality to
officials or it came to official attention.
Although I could say a lot more, my letter is already too long





LTC U.S. Army (retired)
Encls.
cc: President of the United States
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
TJAG, U.S. Army
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